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Circulating science, incompletely regulating commodities: governing from a distance in 
transnational agro-food regulation 
Ryan E. Galt 
[word count excluding references: 5806] 
 
Whereas exposure to pesticides through occupation or accident is basically a local problem, capable 
of being countered by national legislation or education, the contamination of food must inevitably 
become a matter of worldwide concern because of the extensive international trade in this 
commodity. 
 — Hough 1998: 88. 
 
Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and 
permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the 
surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of 
power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; … in short, that the inmates should be 
caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers. 
 — Foucault 1977: 201. 
 
In this chapter I show that national agro-food regulations in the global North strongly shape 
international agro-food networks down to specific production practices in specific locales.  
Importantly, this shaping occurs in ways that only partially correspond with the intent of the 
regulation.  Using the case of the regulation of pesticide residues on food, I detail how scientific 
understandings of pesticide risk, and especially the way these are operationalized in pesticide residue 
monitoring, significantly shape the transnational agro-food system and production at the local level.  
Regulatory agencies employ risk assessments and specific techniques of analytical chemistry to 
enforce agro-food regulation, but these techniques are limited in their coverage because of the 
massive resources required to detect all residues.  These risk assessments and their always-partial 
application in agro-food regulation govern from afar and create local policing regimes that ultimately 
shape economic and ecological activities at the farm level in places tied into global North markets 
through the production of exported food commodities.  The shaping is highly uneven due to local 
circumstances and because of the necessarily partial nature of enforcement.  Below I use the case of 
two specific pesticides and their use in Costa Rican export vegetable production demonstrate how 
agro-food government at a distance shapes local practice. 
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Pesticide residue regulation 
Of all the negative consequences of pesticide use, pesticide residues1 in food have generated, and 
continue to generate, the most concern in the general population (Baker et al. 2002; Whorton 1974).  
Pesticides degrade over time at different rates depending upon the compound, exposure to sun and 
other weathering forces, and the ability of organisms to metabolize them.  They often will degrade to 
a level below the detection limit of modern equipment,2 but they remain on food.  ?One of the 
fundamental principles of pesticide residue chemistry is that if a compound is used on a food crop 
there will be a residue in the food—whether or not it is detectable by the chosen analytical method 
or even by state-of-the-art techniques? (Wargo 1998: 152).  Whether detected or not, we do not see 
pesticide residues and most of us do not think about them, yet we ingest them with almost every 
meal (Baker et al. 2002). 
The health effects of pesticide residues in food remain vigorously debated.  Showing that 
chronic, low-dose pesticide exposure is safe or harmful is currently beyond the limits of toxicology 
and epidemiology (Shrader-Frechette 1985).  As Beck (1992, 64) notes, “[a] central term for ‘I don’t 
know either’ is ‘acceptable level.’” Many citizens consider pesticides a dreaded risk because the 
mechanisms by which pesticides affect health are unfamiliar, the potential effects are serious but 
delayed, and the risk is imposed rather than voluntary (Slovic 1987).  Thus, great citizen concern 
persists over pesticide residues (Knight and Warland 2004). 
Nation-states use some of their resources to employ risk assessments that establish legal limits 
concerning which pesticides are allowed at what levels on certain foods.  In the US, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets these limits, called “tolerances” or, outside the US, 
maximum residue levels (MRLs).  Current US regulation involves MRLs for 371 different active 
ingredients of synthetic pesticides (Environmental Protection Agency 2007).  The state also uses its 
resources to monitor residues on food based on these MRLs, a role the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) performs in the US.  This residue regulation creates a double-edged sword.  
On the one hand, its existence helps assure citizens that their food will not poison them, at least not 
immediately.  On the other, this regulation serves as a state-sanctioned legitimation of pesticide 
residues in food, which many consider an intolerable risk.  As Rachel Carson noted, “[i]n the end the 
                                                
1 Pesticide residues are traces of pesticide that remain on a product after it has been sprayed or 
treated in post-harvest. 
2 Pesticide detection in analytical chemistry has advanced greatly in the last century to the point 
where parts per quadrillion of some chemical substances can be detected. 
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luckless consumer pays his taxes but gets his poison regardless” ([1962] 1994: 183).   
Carson hints at another important point: the pesticide residue regulation system, and especially 
its extension across national borders where many other pesticides might be allowed and used on 
export produce, assumes constant and vigilant enforcement.  The possibilities that (1) pesticide 
residues on foods may exceed MRLs and (2) foods may contain residues not allowed on that food, 
necessitate constant monitoring for all potential residue combinations if the government were to 
actually assure consumers that their food complies entirely with US law.  In other words, MRLs 
require and assume a panoptic style of enforcement that is ever active.3 
Tracing two pesticide with different risk profiles 
Many pesticide “families” exist.  Two of the most commonly used families are organophosphate 
(OP) insecticides and ethylenebis-dithiocarbamate (EBDC) fungicides.  I choose a representative of 
each of these two families as the major non-human actors, or actants (cf. Callon 1986), in this 
chapter because of their very different risk profiles, and the large difference in the way their residues 
interact with monitoring and enforcement meant to find and regulate them.  These actants are 
methamidophos, a systemic OP, and mancozeb, a non-systemic EBDC.4  Tracing methamidophos 
and mancozeb and their regulation is not meant to provide an overall view of pesticide regulation, 
but instead I purposefully select them as two endpoints of enforcement for risky pesticides: those 
that are highly monitored, and those least monitored.  In their specific characteristics they cannot 
adequately represent their chemical families, but in the way they are regulated and perceived by 
farmers they can adequately stand in without creating large distortions. 
The German chemist Gerhard Schrader first developed the potent organophosphate insecticides 
(OPs) in the late 1930s (Carson 1994: 28).  Chemists then modified them for use in World War II as 
potent nerve gases (Russell 2001), testing their toxicity on prisoners at Auschwitz (Du Bois 1952).  
OPs became available to farmers in the US in 1946 (Shepard 1951: 6), one year after the (in)famous 
DDT made its debut.  This history reveals that, in addition to acting as powerful, broad-spectrum 
insecticides, the OPs are clearly neurotoxins and very acutely toxic to humans and other mammals. 
                                                
3 The panopticism discussed here is analogous to Foucault’s (1977) discussion of Bentham’s 
Panopticon.  Similarly, if a panoptic style of governance is successful, export farmers in faraway 
places will self-regulate to avoid being disciplined and punished for being out of compliance with US 
regulation . 
4 Systemic refers to pesticides that enter plant tissues and move throughout them, while non-
systemic pesticides work on the plant’s surface where they come into contact with pests. 
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The OPs rose to particular prominence in agriculture once governments in the 1970s began 
banning the organochlorine insecticides like DDT, which persist and bioaccumulate in the 
environment, thereby causing harm to both wildlife and human health (Carson 1994).  Relative to 
the organochlorines, OPs generally persist for a shorter time in the environment, although they 
present a much higher risk of acute poisoning and death to farm workers (Wright 1986, 1990).  They 
affect the central and peripheral nervous system by binding to and deactivating the vital enzyme 
acetylcholinesterase, resulting in uncontrolled, repeated firing at nerve junctions.  Poisoning 
symptoms include excessive sweating, salivation, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal cramps, 
general weakness, headache, poor concentration and tremors.  Serious cases involve respiratory 
failure and death.  Long-term effects of poisoning events involve lower dexterity, attention, and 
visual motor skills (Rosenstock et al. 1991), and studies of long-term exposures to low doses have 
generated mixed conclusions, with some showing exposed populations with lowered cognition and 
motor skills (Vergara 1993), and others showing no difference (Ray 1998).  Poisoning by OPs 
account for around 80 percent of pesticide-related hospital admissions in the US (Taylor 2001, cited 
in Casida and Quistad 2004), similar to the pattern of OPs and their cousins the carbamates causing 
72 percent of pesticide-poisoning deaths where documented in developing countries (Roberts et al. 
2003). 
Methamidophos is a very acutely toxic, systemic OP.  Its systemic nature means it translocates 
throughout the plant, working for weeks to kill insects that feed on the plant.  This characteristic 
makes it popular with farmers, but potentially problematic for consumers.  Cases of farm worker 
and farmer poisonings often involve methamidophos.  In Nicaragua, 77 percent of cases were 
caused by methamidophos and carbofuran, an acutely toxic carbamate insecticide (McConnell and 
Hruska 1993: 1559).  Similarly, in Sri Lanka, before it was banned, methamidophos and 
monocrotophos, another OP, caused the majority of poisonings (Roberts et al. 2003).  With figures 
such as these, methamidophos has been identified as one of the 12 most dangerous pesticides which 
the health ministers of Central American countries have agreed to ban (Nieto Z. 2001).   
Methamidophos residues have also been responsible for a large number of poisonings of 
consumers due to high levels of residues (Chan 2001; Wu et al. 2001), including the recent 
(contested) poisonings in Japan from Chinese dumplings (channelnewsasia.com 2008).  Work 
measuring OP metabolites in the US population shows that OP metabolite concentrations are 
significantly higher in children ages six to 11 than adults, and that most of the population is exposed 
to OPs (Barr et al. 2004).  This result makes sense when we take into account the human ecology of 
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residues: children often eat fruits in much greater proportion to body weight than adults, and much 
conventional fruit and vegetable production relies heavily on OP insecticides (Wargo 1998). 
The ethylenebis-dithiocarbamates (EBDCs) — originally developed as accelerators in the rubber 
vulcanization process (Russell 2005) — became subject to a concerted effort to employ laboratory 
techniques to discover new fungicides.  Through his laboratory experiments, McCallan (1930) at 
Cornell University first described EBDCs as having fungicidal action.  The EBDCs were first 
patented in 1934 by Tilsdale and Williams at DuPont, but the first, thiram, did not appear on the 
market until 1942 (Russell 2005).  By the 1950s, the EBDCs were in use globally (Dich et al. 1997).  
These were the first organic5 fungicides, classified as such because their new chemical configurations 
included carbon from compounds in fossil fuels. 
In contrast to the OPs, the EBDCs are not acutely toxic to humans, yet concern focuses on 
cancer (Dich et al. 1997) and birth defects caused by the compounds and their carcinogenic 
breakdown product, ethylenethiourea (ETU) (Holland et al. 1994).  Epidemiological studies show a 
variety of negative effects of chronic exposure to EBDC fungicides, including thyroid toxicity and 
tumor generation (Houeto et al. 1995).  A rarely cited study from the 1970s showed increases in 
thyroid and liver cancers in regions with higher EBDC exposure as estimated by sales and crop 
production data (von Meyer 1977, cited in Houeto et al. 1995).  A more recent study showed an 
increase in relatively rare cancers (thyroid, bone, testis, thymus, and other endocrine glands) in the 
region in Minnesota where EBDCs are most heavily used, where potato, wheat, and sugar beet are 
grown (Schreinemachers et al. 1999).  Clinical studies of fifty workers with chronic exposure to 
maneb had “significantly increased incidences of various neurologic effects (including cogwheel 
rigidity, fatigue, and complaints of memory loss) and increases in a variety of other Parkinson-like 
symptoms (including tremor, ataxia, and bradykinesia)” relative to a non-exposed control group 
(Ferraz et al. 1988, paraphrased in Houeto et al. 1995).  Toxicological studies on rats have shown 
EBDCs to be teratogenic, damaging the reproductive organs of males and females, which results in 
malformations in offspring and decreased fertility (Houeto et al. 1995). 
Mancozeb, an EBDC based on manganese and zinc, was introduced in 1961, and is likely the 
most commonly used of its chemical class (Russell 2005).  EPA classifies mancozeb and ETU, its 
breakdown product, as “probable human carcinogens.”  One review of mancozeb residues on 
                                                
5 Far predating the application of the term “organic” to an agriculture that does not depend on 
synthetic fertilizer and pesticide inputs, chemists use the term to refer to compounds containing 
carbon of biological origin. 
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apples suggested that according to “supervised trials, including harvest at the recommended PHIs, 
the most likely resulting dithiocarbamate residue is in the vicinity of 0.90 mg/kg [ppm] for 
mancozeb” (Hamilton et al. 1997: 1405).  An assessment by the National Academy of Science that it 
and many other fungicides pose relatively high risks of cancer if allowed to persist on food at their 
MRLs,6 with an estimated risk of 3.4 per 10,000 individuals, much higher than EPA’s rule of thumb 
of one in one million (NAS 1987, cited in Wargo 1998: 119).  Under high heat (cooking), EBDCs 
convert to ETU at rates up to 50 percent.  In contrast to some knowledge on mancozeb residues, 
the literature lacks information on home-cooked foods with EBDC residues and their conversion to 
ETU (Holland et al. 1994). 
Specific mechanisms of toxicity are important to the effects of these two pesticides on 
farmworker and consumer health.  As Dich et al. (1997: 421) note,  
Pesticides with an extremely high acute toxicity may be easily metabolized and eliminated 
from the body; following long-term low exposure, they may be less toxic and without 
carcinogenic or mutagenic properties. On the other hand, pesticides with low acute toxicity 
… can accumulate in the body and cause chronic toxicity after long-term exposure even in 
comparatively low doses. 
The first category includes the OP insecticides, as they can be metabolized if the person survives the 
exposure (although, as noted above, long-term effects often result from these exposures).  The 
second category includes those low acute toxicity pesticides that are carcinogenic, like the EBDCs, 
but it is important to note that the EBDCs are not known to bioaccumulate. 
Government at a distance 
How do these actants perform on the world stage?  The United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) Codex Alimentarius has worked to “harmonize” pesticide residue regulations 
internationally by setting specific MRLs for crop-pesticide combinations.  These are non-binding 
standards meant to harmonize residue regulations internationally, though many nations continue to 
use their own risk assessments and regulatory systems (Hough 1998).  Table 1 shows EPA’s and 
FAO’s MRLs for methamidophos, and Table 2 shows the same for mancozeb.  While Hough (1998) 
notes that EPA standards are usually more restrictive than FAO standards, the opposite appears to 
                                                
6 Not all foods on which mancozeb is permitted have mancozeb at its MRL, so risks here are likely 
overestimated if we assume exposure to only mancozeb (but for a critique of the single exposure 
idea, see Carson 1994; Wargo 1998). 
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be the case for these two pesticides: EPA MRLs are generally higher than FAO’s, thereby allowing 
for more exposure to consumers.  These MRLs and their national differences become important to 
the global food regime when produce crosses national boundaries. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE [data source is (Environmental Protection Agency 2007; 
Food and Agriculture Organization 2008)] 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE [data source is (Environmental Protection Agency 2007; 
Food and Agriculture Organization 2008)] 
Not only do MRLs differ between countries, but so do regulations that register the agricultural 
use of certain pesticides and ban others.  Figures 1 and 2 reveal the global regulatory status in terms 
of use regulations for methamidophos and mancozeb.  Both of these maps demonstrate the highly 
uneven regulations between nation states.  Methamidophos, while registered for a number of crops 
in the US, is banned or never registered in a large number of countries, including large numbers of 
African and Southeast Asian countries.  Regulation in Europe, Latin America, and South and East 
Asia is highly heterogeneous.  Indeed, no consensus exists within most world regions, with the 
exception of North America, in which both the US and Canada allow methamidophos use (Figure 
1).  Mancozeb remains a commonly used fungicide in the US and is also registered in Australia, 
Canada, India, and many African and European countries.  In contrast, Sweden has strongly 
restricted mancozeb because it causes cancer and genotoxic effects, and many African nations have 
never registered it (Figure 2). 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE [data source is (Orme and Kegley 2008)] 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE [data source is (Orme and Kegley 2008)] 
The heterogeneous regulatory status shown by the global maps of pesticide registrations hint at 
the enormous complexity of international pesticide regulation and the difficulties faced by various 
actors in global agro-food systems.  More then 651 pesticide active ingredients exist in the world, 
and most have highly heterogeneous regulation across the globe.  For farmers and export firms, 
there is potentially a bewildering array of difference in complying with pesticide residue regulations 
in trade between nations.  For national governments, imposing their own regulations on the global 
flows of food poses a considerable challenge, as the specific production practices in other countries 
remain hidden from government regulators.  If nations are successful in their regulation attempts, 
these efforts expand the governing of agro-food systems along octopus-like tentacles that are 
extensions of power from the nation state to the specific locales — down to the land user and even 
specific agricultural fields — where pesticide regulations intersect with farmers’ production 
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practices.  The more powerful and wealthy the nation state and its pesticide residue monitoring, the 
stronger the tentacles.  Latour calls this type of control “action at a distance” (Latour 1987), and 
others have drawn on that concept to discuss “government at a distance” (Agrawal 2005: 123; Miller 
and Rose 1990) or “regulation from afar” (Galt 2007).  
In the case of pesticide residues, government at a distance specifically involves (1) risk 
assessments that set MRLs, (2) sampling of produce to test for residues, and (3) residue testing using 
the laboratory methods of analytical chemistry to enforce MRLs.  These risk assessments and their 
enforcement ultimately have important effects on the actions of farmers who are not directly 
controlled within the territory of the regulatory body.  As Agrawal (2005: 194) notes, “[a]ction at a 
distance thus overcomes the effects of physical separation by creating regulations known to those 
located at a distance.”  Although Agrawal (2005) refers to the devolution of some control to 
community forestry councils in Kumaon, India, in agro-food systems as well this “government at a 
distance” becomes supplemented and enforced by “intimate government” in each locality tied to the 
global market through its export production system.  In export production systems, this intimate 
government often rests on export firms that construct specific understandings of regulations of 
various export markets and enforce these among the farmers with whom they contract. 
FDA’s uneven enforcement of tolerances 
Critiques of FDA’s residue testing often focus on the low percentages of total imported food 
that is tested (General Accounting Office 1986a, 1986b; Wargo 1998; Wright 1990).  The New York 
Times recently posted an online computer game that readers can play to reveal how FDA can only 
test a minute percentage of imported produce (Persuasive Games 2007).  Less than one percent of 
produce is tested (General Accounting Office 1986a: 3), and this seems inadequate to many.  While I 
agree that the level of observation is indeed suboptimal, my research suggests that the testing has 
important but partial effects, as exporters and export farmers have attempted to rationalize pesticide 
use based on previous residue violations (Galt 2007).  In other words, the specific residues tests 
employed — with their ability to detect some pesticides but not others — have important effects. 
I argue that we need to explore the specific manifestations of government from a distance, i.e., 
the exact ways in which FDA testing occurs, and how this manifests itself in land users’ decisions, 
one of political ecology’s historic foci (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987).  The specificities of the field of 
analytical chemistry impact export farmers.  The field—its advances, the limitations of its methods, 
and the resources needed to employ them—all matter greatly in the way that government at a 
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distance manifests itself in specific locales of agro-food production tied into export channels. 
Methods of analytical chemistry have improved dramatically over the course of the last half-
century both in terms of the number of compounds that can be detected in a single test, and also in 
the limits of detection (usually expressed in parts per million, or ppm).  For most residue tests, FDA 
relies mostly on multiresidue methods (MRMs), which can determine the presence and level of a 
number of different pesticide residues simultaneously.  FDA’s Pesticide Analytical Manual instructs 
its chemists: “[w]henever a sample of unknown pesticide treatment history is analyzed, and no 
residue(s) is targeted, a multiclass MRM should be used to provide the broadest coverage of 
potential residues” (FDA 1999a: 301-1).  The number of residues detected with one MRM has 
expanded as chemists refine and improve the specific screening modules used (see Figure 3).  The 
commonly used MRMs, e.g., the Luke method (Luke et al. 1988) and its subsequent modifications 
(Food and Drug Administration 2000a), can determine residues of close to half of the approximately 
400 pesticides for which EPA has set tolerances (FDA 2004: 3).  The MRMs commonly used by 
FDA can also determine residues of many pesticides for which EPA has revoked tolerances, such as 
DDT and many other organochlorine pesticides.   
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE [source is (Food and Drug Administration 1999a)] 
It is important to note that the “ultimate” MRM analyses developed by academic chemists can 
detect over 400 pesticides (Stan 2000), but these are complex, and thus expensive, for use in the 
regulatory setting.  Employing these “ultimate,” almost panoptic methods is thus out of the question 
for the state.  About the use of various screening modules of MRMs to expand the detection 
potential, the FDA manual blithely notes that “[t]he user may choose as many or as few of these 
modules as time and resources permit” (FDA 1999a: 301-1).  Time and resources are clearly limited, 
so coverage does not include the “ultimate” MRMs from the labs of academic chemists. 
Single residue methods (SRMs) determine the residue level of a single pesticide or highly related 
group of pesticides, while selective MRMs determine a small group of chemicals.  Both of these are 
considerably more expensive than MRMs on a per-residue-determined basis and are therefore used 
much less frequently (FDA Pesticide Program 2004).  FDA gives very little external indications as to 
the circumstances under which its chemists choose to use SRMS.  In its manual, FDA notes that 
“[t]hese methods are most often used when the likely residue is known to the chemist and/or when 
the residue of interest cannot be determined by common MRMs” (FDA 1999a: v). 
These seemingly tedious specificities about residue testing impact our two dangerous 
protagonists, methamidophos and mancozeb, and the way they are used and perceived.  As an OP, 
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methamidophos belongs to the 200 pesticides that can be detected by most MRMs FDA uses.  On 
the other hand, the EBDCs, including mancozeb, belong to the 200 that cannot be detected using 
common MRMs.  Instead, SRMs must be used to detect them (Chang et al. 2005).7  As noted above, 
EPA considers mancozeb and other EBDCs to be high-risk pesticides (Hettenbach and Wile 2000) 
and has set MRLs that in theory should be enforced.  Additionally, many agricultural sectors rely on 
mancozeb in many countries — for example, it accounts for 30 percent of all fungicides used in 
Costa Rica (Humbert et al. 2007) — and it appears very regularly on produce in developing and 
industrialized countries when it is specifically tested for (Chang et al. 2005; Hamilton et al. 1997; 
Vargas and Rodríguez 1996).  Costa Rican tests have shown that mancozeb exceeds FAO’s MRLs 
on fresh8 sweet peppers and tomatoes at rates of 50 percent and 19 percent, respectively (Vargas and 
Rodríguez 1996: 58). 
Table 3 shows FDA tests for the two actants methamidophos and mancozeb.  While FDA 
conducted a handful of tests for mancozeb on imported produce each year in the late 1990s, FDA 
no longer tests for mancozeb on imported produce, presumably because of a lack of resources for 
SRMs.  Mancozeb, despite being in heavy use for more almost 50 years, remains a kind of fugitive 
actant that has eluded analytical chemists’ attempts to fold it into their overall project of panoptic 
but affordable MRMs.  The state must expend considerable resources to find mancozeb, and clearly 
chooses not to do so.  In contrast, methamidophos remains a pesticide that will be detected by many 
MRMs that FDA labs use.  It remains within the view of US pesticide residue regulation on 
imported food. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE [data source is (Food and Drug Administration 1999b, 2000b, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005)] 
The characteristics of the various pesticide actants — mancozeb presents a risk of cancer and 
birth defects, and methamidophos presents a risk of acute poisoning and neurological impairment 
— has caused EPA to regulate pesticide use on food through the creation of MRLs on specific 
                                                
7 The FDA manual notes that “[a]nalyses for residues of ethylenebisdithiocarbamates (EBDCs) 
require special handling of the laboratory sample. EBDCs decompose rapidly as soon as the crop 
surface is broken and residues contact water, enzymes, and sugars” (FDA 1999a: 102-6), which 
happens when lab personnel prepare samples for residue testing. 
8 It appears as though cooking does cause the breakdown of EBDCs (Chavarri et al. 2005), but as 
noted above cooking also causes EBDCs to convert to the carcinogen ETU.  Problematically, only 
once EBDC residues are detected — a rare situation since they are not detected by MRMs that FDA 
commonly uses (Table 3) — does FDA test for the carcinogenic breakdown product ETU (Food 
and Drug Administration 2000c). 
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foods.  Both their relationship to analytical chemistry — mancozeb remains a fugitive to common 
MRM tests, while analytical chemists can relatively easily find methamidophos — and the lack of 
material resources — labor and time to fulfill the panoptic requirements of thousands of specific 
MRLs — shape the actual regulatory structure that governs agro-food systems from a distance.  
What effects does a regulatory structure that can only find some pesticides create?  How does it 
shape intimate government created by the control structures of exporters and, ultimately, farmer 
behavior? 
Effects of uneven enforcement on the intimate governing of Costa Rican vegetable 
production 
For the purpose of understanding the influence of pesticide residue regulation on export farmers 
it is essential to consider contract farming because it “presupposes some form of regulation and 
control, a sort of direct fashioning, of the labor process by the contractor, and a web of social 
relations, which are practically and ideologically central to the production system” (Watts 1992: 70).  
Exporters with imperfect understandings of US pesticide residue regulation employ this “direct 
fashioning” or intimate governing of the production process.  A handful of export firms contract 
with Costa Rican farmers for export vegetables in Northern Cartago and the Ujarrás Valley, Costa 
Rica.  These firms export squash, green beans, chayote (a native cucurbit), and other vegetables to 
the US, Canada, and the European Union (Figure 4). 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE [source is author’s collection] 
Exporters do not have a complete understanding of US or FAO pesticide residue regulations, 
and they intentionally simplify the message about pesticides to export farmers.  To paraphrase, most 
emphasize that farmers cannot use OPs or the older organochlorines.  The Costa Rican state 
through its Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería (MAG) has also been involved in communicating 
with farmers and monitoring produce for prohibited pesticides — particularly methamidophos — in 
the chayote sector.  Because methamidophos and other OP residues on chayote and squash have 
caused violations of US tolerances in the past — resulting in the loss of entire shipments and the 
income those bring — exporters and MAG attempt to exert control over farmers’ use of OP 
insecticides through various policing mechanisms.  This intimate governance focuses on insecticides, 
but largely ignores fungicides like mancozeb, as these have never caused violations in the past.  As 
we have seen, they have never caused violations of US residue law in part because MRMs will not 
detect them.  If, for example, they were detected on green beans and other vegetables for which they 
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do not have a US tolerance (see Table 2), they would be in violation of US law.  
Data from a survey of 148 Costa Rican vegetable farmers supports the idea that farmers treat 
fungicides like mancozeb quite differently from OP insecticides like methamidophos.  Figures 5 
shows pesticide use as it relates to the residue question for squash produced for the open national 
market and the export market.  The pesticide details section on the left includes pesticide active 
ingredients, their “pesticide group,” and check boxes showing whether they are classified as Bad 
Actors according to the Pesticide Action Network classification.9  The open national market section 
and the export market sections present similarly ordered data: number of farmers using it, regulatory 
information, the waiting period between spray and harvest (also known as “pre-harvest interval” or 
PHI), and dose used.  The dose section on the right side of each market section shows doses used 
by each farmer relative to the maximum recommended dose on the label, which is set at 100 
percent.  The average dose sits to the left of the dose plot.  A gray fill signifies that the dose exceeds 
the label’s requirements.  The PHI section in Figure 5 shows the result of subtracting the minimum 
required PHI on the label from minimum PHIs reported by farmers.  Thus, a zero means that the 
farmer waited just long enough between spray and harvest, while a negative number means that the 
farmer did not wait long enough.  The average is to the left of the PHI plot.  The gray background 
shows that a use violates the PHI required by the Costa Rican label. 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE [source is (Galt in review)] 
Export squash farmers’ OP use generally complies with requirements for dose and the PHI.  
Their use of organophosphates generally, and methamidophos specifically, reflect the exporters’ and 
MAG’s concern over causing more violations and losing income from rejections.  In this sense, they 
have become partial, Foucauldian “environmental subjects” created by government from afar (cf. 
Agrawal 2005).  In contrast, export farmers generally violate the PHI for mancozeb, as well as most 
other fungicides.  Many farmers in the area see fungicides as essentially harmless agrochemicals (Galt 
2007).  Exporters and MAG have done little to change this perception, as they have never 
experienced direct economic losses, or even a hint of a problem, due to fungicide residues. 
Implicit in farmers’ and exporters’ understandings of US pesticide residue regulation is that it is 
                                                
9 Bad Actor pesticides are those that meet any of the following criteria: highly acute toxic according 
to the World Health Organization (WHO), EPA, or the US National Toxicology Program; a known 
or probable carcinogen according to EPA; a reproductive or developmental toxin listed in 
California's Proposition 65; a cholinesterase inhibitor according to the Material Safety Data Sheet 
(MSDS), the California Department of Pesticide Regulation, or the PAN staff’s evaluation of 
chemical structure; or a known groundwater contaminant (Orme and Kegley 2008). 
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truly panoptic like as Bentham’s Panopticon: if fungicides caused health problems, they would be 
regulated by the US government, and strict and complete enforcement would guarantee that those 
fungicides most threatening to human health would be detected and the offender disciplined.  This 
kind of discipline has been the case for OP insecticides, but this lack of negative feedback for 
fungicide residues serves to reinforce a view of them as safe products. 
Conclusions 
This examination of pesticide residue regulation and enforcement, traced through the actants of 
methamidophos and mancozeb and their use in a specific locale, allows for a number of conclusions.  
First, pesticide residue regulations and enforcement act as de facto agro-environmental regulations 
from afar that create partial environmental subjects out of export farmers.  This government from a 
distance is, in the case of Costa Rica, more often powerful than its own “government from nearby” 
as farmers pay considerably more attention to the residue issues of pesticides for export than they 
do when producing for the national market (Galt in review).  This results from large differences in 
the enforcement budgets between the countries, and also from the subordinate position of Costa 
Rica in the world economy vis-à-vis the global north, manifested in the need of Costa Rica to 
continue agricultural exports to generate foreign exchange to service its international debt accrued 
from previous decades of development.  By opting into the world system, Costa Rica must maintain 
exports, and therefore must play by the rules of the more powerful. 
Second, in this era of market-based solutions to environmental problems, this research shows 
that regulation works, but, from the perspective of protecting human health, the current manner in 
which it works is flawed.  The understanding of pesticide residue testing as truly panoptic does 
indeed instill self-regulation by partial environmental subjects through intimate governance at the 
point of production.  However, a contradiction arises: although EPA, exporters, and export farmers 
perceive US pesticide residue regulation as panoptic, it clearly is not (Table 3 and Figure 5).  This 
leads to a serious disconnect where farmers view fungicides like mancozeb as not harmful to human 
health and exercise considerably less caution with them.  Equally problematic is that EPA continues 
to assume the existence of an adequate regulatory apparatus, one that is essentially all seeing when it 
comes to residues, when it approves pesticides.  Rather than being panoptic, it is clearly demi-optic 
(half-seeing), with considerable problems — especially lack of local concern about pesticides that 
can cause cancer and birth defects — resulting from misunderstanding that this creates.  
Third, the decline in the amount of FDA residue testing between the late 1990s and the early 
 14 
2000s is disturbing both from the point of view of US consumers and for those concerned with the 
potential positive impact of US residue regulations on export sectors (as de facto agri-environmental 
regulation from afar).  While the US in its neoliberal zeal has not revoked MRLs, in terms of 
pesticide residue enforcement the US has become a “weak” state.  As McCarthy (2002: 1288-9) 
notes, “the United States, often portrayed as the gold standard of sovereign state capacity, actually 
experiences many of the problems and limitations supposedly diagnostic of ‘weak’ states in 
controlling its own territory and population.”  These decisions are political decisions pushed by the 
Bush Administration, which makes it no secret that consumer and environmental protections are 
low priority areas relative to war and control over dissidents.  Significant pushback against 
neoliberalism is needed on many fronts, including the realm of agro-food regulation. 
Figures captions 
Figure 1: A global view of national registration statuses of mancozeb 
Figure 2: A global view of national registration statuses of methamidophos 
Figure 3: The residue testing procedures from FDA’s Pesticide Analytical Manual.  The various 
modules (e.g., DG2) will detect different groups of pesticides. 
Figure 4: A box of chayote ready for export to the United States. 
Figure 5: Pesticide use on open national market and export squash in relation to regulation, 
Northern Cartago and the Ujarrás Valley, 2003 
References 
Agrawal, Arun. 2005. Environmentality: technologies of government and the making of subjects. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
Baker, B.P., C.M. Benbrook, Edward Groth, III, and K. Lutz Benbrook. 2002. Pesticide residues in 
conventional, integrated pest management (IPM)-grown and organic foods: Insights from 
three US data sets. Food Additives and Contaminants 19 (5):427-46. 
Barr, Dana B., Roberto Bravo, Gayanga Weerasekera, Lisa M. Caltabiano, Jr. Ralph D. Whitehead, 
Anders O. Olsson, Samuel P. Caudill, Susan E. Schober, James L. Pirkle, Eric J. Sampson, 
Richard J. Jackson, and Larry L. Needham. 2004. Concentrations of dialkyl phosphate 
metabolites of organophosphorus pesticides in the U.S. population. Environmental Health 
Perspectives 112 (2):186–200. 
Beck, Ulrich. 1992. The risk society: Towards a new modernity. Translated by M. Ritter. Newbury Park, 
California: Sage Publications. Original edition, 1986. 
Blaikie, Piers, and Harold Brookfield. 1987. Land degradation and society. London: Methuen. 
Callon, Michel. 1986. Some elements of a sociology of translation: Domestication of the scallops 
and the fishermen of St Brieuc Bay. In Power, action, and belief: A new sociology of knowledge?, pp. 
196-233, edited by J. Law. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Carson, Rachel. 1994. Silent spring. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. Original edition, 1962. 
 15 
Casida, John E., and Gary B. Quistad. 2004. Organophosphate toxicology: Safety aspects of 
nonacetylcholinesterase secondary targets. Chemical Research in Toxicology 17 (8):983-98. 
Chan, Thomas Y.K. 2001. Vegetable-borne methamidophos poisoning (letter). Clinical Toxicology 39 
(4):337-8. 
Chang, Ju-Mei, Tay-Hwa Chen, and Tony J. Fang. 2005. Pesticide residue monitoring in marketed 
fresh vegetables and fruits in central Taiwan (1999-2004) and an introduction to the HACCP 
system. Journal of Food and Drug Analysis 13 (4):368-76. 
channelnewsasia.com. 2008. Officials say Chinese-made dumplings not contaminated in China,  [cited 28 
February 2008]. Available from URL 
:http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/eastasia/view/331663/1/.html. 
Chavarri, Ma Jesuús, Antonio Herrera, and Agustín Ariño. 2005. The decrease in pesticides in fruit 
and vegetables during commercial processing. International Journal of Food Science and Technology 
40:205-11. 
Dich, Jan, Shelia Hoar Zahm, Annika Hanberg, and Hans-Olov Adami. 1997. Pesticides and cancer. 
Cancer Causes and Control 8 (3):420-43. 
Du Bois, Josiah Ellis. 1952. The Devil's chemists: 24 conspirators of the international Farben cartel who 
manufacture wars. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Environmental Protection Agency. 2008. Title 40: Protection of environment (Revised July 1, 2007). 
Environmental Protection Agency,,  [cited 14 May 2008]. Available from 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_07/40cfr180_07.html. 
Food and Agriculture Organization. 2008. Codex alimentarius: pesticide residues in food. Food and 
Agriculture Organization,  [cited 14 May 2008]. Available from 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/mrls/pestdes/jsp/pest_q-e.jsp. 
Food and Drug Administration. 1999a. Pesticide analytical manual. 3rd, revised October 1999 ed. Vol. 
1: multiresidue methods. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services. 
———. 1999b. Pesticide Program pesticide monitoring database 1998, edited by Food and Drug 
Administration. 
———. 2000a. Improved Luke multi-residue pesticide procedure: Center for Food Safety and 
Applied Nutrition. 
———. 2000b. Pesticide Program pesticide monitoring database 1999, edited by Food and Drug 
Administration. 
———. 2005. Pesticides and industrial chemicals in imported foods ( issued June 14, 2000). U.S. Food Drug 
Administration, Center for Food Safety Applied Nutrition, Food Compliance Program,  
[cited 26 January 2005]. Available from http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/~comm/cp04016.html. 
———. 2002. Pesticide Program pesticide monitoring database 2000, edited by Food and Drug 
Administration. 
———. 2003. Pesticide Program pesticide monitoring database 2001, edited by Food and Drug 
Administration. 
———. 2004. Pesticide Program pesticide monitoring database 2002, edited by Food and Drug 
Administration. 
———. 2005. Pesticide Program pesticide monitoring database 2003,  [cited 27 January 2005]. Available 
from http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~download/pes03db.html. 
Food and Drug Administration Pesticide Program. 2004. Residue monitoring 2002. Washington, D.C.: 
Food and Drug Administration. 
Foucault, Michel. 1977. Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison. 1st American ed. New York: 
Pantheon Books. 
 16 
Galt, Ryan E. 2007. Regulatory risk and farmers’ caution with pesticides in Costa Rica. Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers 32 (3):377-94. 
———. in review. “It just goes to kill Ticos”: national market regulation and the political ecology of 
farmers’ pesticide use in Costa Rica. Journal of Political Ecology. 
General Accounting Office. 1986a. Better sampling and enforcement needed on imported food. 
Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office. 
———. 1986b. Need to enhance FDA's ability to protect the public from illegal residues. 
Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office. 
Hamilton, D.J., P.T. Holland, B. Ohlin, W.J. Murray, A. Ambrus, G.C. De Baptista, and J. 
Kovacicová. 1997. Optimum use of available residue data in the estimation of dietary intake 
of pesticides. Pure and Applied Chemistry 69 (9):1373-410. 
Hettenbach, Todd, and Richard Wile. 2000. A few bad apples... pesticides in your produce: why 
supermarkets should ‘test and tell’. Washington, D.C.: Environmental Working Group. 
Holland, P.T., D. Hamilton, B. Ohlin, and M.W. Skidmore. 1994. Effects of storage and processing 
on pesticide residues in plant products. Pure and Applied Chemistry 66 (2):335-56. 
Houeto, P., G. Bindoula, and J. R. Hoffman. 1995. Ethylenebisdithiocarbamates and 
ethylenethiourea: possible human health hazards. Environmental Health Perspectives 103 (6):568. 
Hough, Peter. 1998. The global politics of pesticides: forging consensus from conflicting interests. London: 
Earthscan. 
Humbert, Sébastien, Manuele Margni, Raphael Charles, Osccar M. Torres Salazar, Anna L. Quirós, 
and Olivier Jolliet. 2007. Toxicity assessment of the main pesticides used in Costa Rica. 
Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment 118:183-90. 
Knight, Andrew, and Rex Warland. 2004. The relationship between sociodemographics and concern 
about food safety issues. Journal of Consumer Affairs 38 (1):107-20. 
Latour, Bruno. 1987. Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Luke, Milton A., Herbert T. Masumoto, Thomas Cairns, and Harvey K. Hundley. 1988. Levels and 
incidences of pesticide residues in various foods and animal feeds analyzed by the Luke 
multiresidue methodology for fiscal years 1982-1986. Journal of the Association of Official 
Analytical Chemists 71 (2):415-33. 
McCallan, S. E. A. 1930. Studies on fungicides. II. Testing protective fungicides in the laboratory. 
Cornell Agricultural Experimental Station Memoirs 128:8–24. 
McCarthy, James. 2002. First World political ecology: Lessons from the Wise Use movement. 
Environment and Planning A 34 (7):1281-302. 
McConnell, Rob, and Allan J. Hruska. 1993. An epidemic of pesticide poisoning in Nicaragua: 
implications of prevention in developing countries. American Journal of Public Health 83 
(11):1559-62. 
Miller, Peter, and Nikolas Rose. 1990. Governing economic life. Economy and Society 19 (1):1-31. 
Nieto Z., Oscar. 2001. Fichas técnicas de plaguicidas a prohibir o restringir incluidos en el Acuerdo No. 9 de la 
XVI Reunión del Sector Salud de Centroamérica y República Dominicana (RESSCAD). San José, 
Costa Rica: Organización Panamericana de la Salud/Organización Mundial de la Salud 
(OPS/OMS). 
Orme, S., and S. Kegley. 2008. PAN pesticide database  [Internet database]. Pesticide Action Network, 
North America,  [cited 6 May 2008]. Available from http://www.pesticideinfo.org. 
Persuasive Games. 2007. Mind games: food import folly. The New York Times, 24 May. 
Ray, David E. 1998. Chronic effects of low level exposure to anticholinesterases: a mechanistic 
review. Toxicology Letters 102-103:527-33. 
 17 
Roberts, Darren M., Ayanthi Karunarathna, Nick A. Buckley, Gamini Manuweera, M.H. Rezvi 
Sheriff, and Michael Eddleston. 2003. Influence of pesticide regulation on acute poisoning 
deaths in Sri Lanka. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 81 (11):789-98. 
Rosenstock, L., M. Keifer, W. E. Daniell, R. McConnell, and K. Claypoole. 1991. Chronic central 
nervous system effects of acute organophosphate pesticide intoxication. The Lancet 338 
(8761):223-7. 
Russell, Edmund. 2001. War and nature: fighting humans and insects with chemicals from World War I to Silent 
Spring. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Russell, P. E. 2005. A century of fungicide evolution. The Journal of Agricultural Science 143 (1):11-25. 
Schreinemachers, Dina M., John P. Creason, and Vincent F. Garry. 1999. Cancer mortality in 
agricultural regions of Minnesota. Environmental Health Perspectives 107 (3):205-11. 
Shepard, Harold Henry. 1951. The chemistry and action of insecticides. 1st ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Shrader-Frechette, K.S. 1985. Risk analysis and scientific method: Methodological and ethical problems with 
evaluating societal hazards. Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company. 
Slovic, Paul. 1987. Perception of risk. Science 236 (4799):280-5. 
Stan, Hans-Jurgen. 2000. Pesticide residue analysis in foodstuffs applying capillary gas 
chromatography with mass spectrometric detection: State-of-the-art use of modified DFG-
multimethod S19 and automated data evaluation. Journal of Chromatography A 892 (1-2):347-
77. 
Vargas, M.A., and O.M. Rodríguez. 1996. Determinación de residuos de ditiocarbamatos y 
disulfuros de thiuram en legumbres. Ingeniería y Ciencia Química 16 (2):55-68. 
Vergara, Alfredo E. 1993. Agrichemical injuries in banana plantations in Costa Rica: A study of 
neurobehavioral and other health effects. Dissertation, Preventative and Environmental 
Health, University of Iowa. 
Wargo, John. 1998. Our children’s toxic legacy: How science and law fail to protect us from pesticides. Second ed. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Watts, Michael. 1992. Living under contract: Work, production, politics, and the manufacture of 
discontent in a peasant society. In Reworking modernity: Capitalisms and symbolic discontent, pp. 65-
105, edited by A. Pred and M. Watts. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 
Whorton, James C. 1974. Before Silent Spring: Pesticides and public health in pre-DDT America. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Wright, Angus. 1986. Rethinking the circle of poison: The politics of pesticide poisoning among 
Mexican farm workers. Latin American Perspectives 13 (4):26-59. 
———. 1990. The death of Ramón González: The modern agricultural dilemma. Austin: University of Texas 
Press. 
Wu, Ming-Ling, Jou-Fang Deng, Wei-Jen Tsai, Jiin Ger, Sue-Sun Wong, and Hong-Ping Li. 2001. 
Food poisoning due to methamidophos-contaminated vegetables. Clinical Toxicology 39 
(4):333-6. 
 
 
Registered
Restricted
Banned, not registered,
or no import consent
No information
Legend
Registered
Restricted
Banned, not registered,
or no import consent
No information
Legend


25
14
49
-17
-18
47
2
5
4
9
3
-6
2
-6
-1
2
-1
4
5
2
-2
NA
NA
-24
33
0
32
3
-10
27
2
26
2
2
-58
-1
47
17
10
14
-1
-13
-5
-8
2
0
1
-24
-13
-2
2
7
3
-2
2
1
-5
52
4
?
???
?
? ?
?
?
?
?? ??
???? ? ??
?????? ? ??
????? ? ?
?
?
??
??? ?
??
???? ?? ? ?
? ?
?
? ? ? ?
?????? ?? ??
???? ? ?
?
?
? ??
???????
??
?
?
??? ??
?
?? ??
?
? ??? ?
?
?
?
?
??
??
??????? ?
? ??
?
?? ??
???? ? ? ??
????
????? ??
?? ?
?
?
? ? ? ?
??
???
????? ?
?
? ?
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.6
0.2
1.1
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.4
0.5
0.7
0.3
0.4
1.4
0.6
0.7
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.9
0.0
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.1
0.2
0.9
1.1
0.5
0.1
0.0
0.2
0.3
0.6
0.8
0.3
0.5
0.3
0.8
0.8
0.2
0.1
0.4
0.7
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.4
?
???
?
??
?
?
?
? ?? ?
? ??? ???
?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
?????? ?
?
?
??
? ?? ?
? ?
? ?? ?? ? ? ?
? ?
?? ?? ??
?
? ???
????
???? ? ??
???
???
??
???? ??
?
?
? ? ?
???? ???
? ?
?
?
???? ?
?
?? ?
?
?? ? ??
?
?
?
?
? ?
? ?
?? ??
?????
???
?
?? ??
?? ?? ??
? ?
??????? ??? ?
? ??
?
?
??? ?
? ?
? ? ?
?? ?? ??
?
??
z-cypermethrin
copper sulfate (pentahydrate)
azoxystrobin
ascorbic, citric, & lactic acid
1 Applied as granulated fomulations.
Sources: Author's farmer surveys 2003-04 & Costa Rican pesticide labels; La Gaceta (1997) & Rodríguez Solano (1994); EPA (2004) & FDA (2005).
FDA residue test 2003
EPA tolerance
EPA registered
Minim
um
 PHI used
m
inus m
axim
um
recom
m
ended PHI
(in days)
PHI
+20
+40
+60
-20
-40
-60
Average m
inim
um
 PHI
Dose used as
percent of m
axim
um
recom
m
ended dose
0
100
200
Average dose
oxytetracycline hydrochloride
Num
ber of farm
ers (n=15)
esfenvalerate
ethioprophos1
avermectin
chlofenapyr
?Bacillus thuringiensis
diflubenzuron
metaldehyde1
phoxim
potassium salt,  oleic acid
prothiofos
spinosad
teflubenzuron
dimethomorph
folpet
fosethyl-al
gentamycin, sulfate
kasugamycin
metalaxyl-m (mefenoxam)
oxycarboxin
oxytetracycline (terramycin)
streptomycin
thiabendazole
tolclofos-methyl
Insecticides
—————— Open national market ——————
——— PHI ——— –—— Dose ——– ——— PHI ——— –—— Dose ——–
———— Pesticide details ———— ———————— Export market ————————
Fungicides
Herbicides
Sanidad Vegetal residue test
Costa Rican tolerance
Minim
um
 PHI used
m
inus m
inim
um
recom
m
ended PHI
(in days)
PHI
+20
+40
+60
-20
-40
-60
Average m
inim
um
 PHI
Dose used as
percent of m
axim
um
recom
m
ended dose
0
100
200
Average dose
-11
4
-5
13 89
92
62
2
-2
92
-17
12
-7
-18
-12
-19
62
0
-6
-1
39
3
2
-16
-1
0
-5
-12
-5
-8
-5
-6
-5
-18
-6
-12
-5
-1
2
-13
-5
-1
2
-7
-5
-8
-10
3
NA
NA
NA
? ??
???
??? ??? ? ???????
?????
?
?
?
?
????
?
?
?
??? ?? ?
?? ??
?
? ???? ????
?
?? ????
?
???
? ??
??? ?
???
?????
????
???? ?
????
?
?
???
?
?
?? ?
? ?
???
?
?? ??
?
?
?
?????
?????? ?
? ? ????????????
????? ?
??????
???????
??????
?
??????
?????
??
?? ?
1
0.2
0.0
0.8
0.5
0.5
0.2
0.2
1.2
0.3
0.5
1.3
0.7
0.1
0.5
0.6
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.4
0.9
0.7
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.4
0.8
0.5
0.3
1.3
0.8
0.4
0.8
1
0.3
0.3
1.7
1
2.9
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.3
3
4.7
4.4
2.9
???
? ??
???????
????
?
? ?
?
?
?? ??
?
?
?
?
????
?????? ?? ? ??? ?? ?
?
?
?? ?? ?
?? ?
? ???
????
???? ? ? ? ? ??
?
?
?
??
?
??????? ?? ? ? ?
?????????
??????
?
????
? ?
?
???
??? ? ? ? ???
?????
?
?
? ?
? ??
?????? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
? ? ???? ????? ? ? ?
??????
?
? ??
?
???
? ? ?? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ? ??
? ???? ????? ? ? ?
?
Num
ber of farm
ers (n=26)
PAN Bad Actor
cyfluthrin
cypermethrin
deltamethrin
lambda-cyhalothrin
permethrin
acephate
carbofuran1
chlorpyrifos
chlorpyrifos1
diazinon
DDVP (dichlorvos)
dimethoate
ethion
fenamiphos1
malathion
methamidophos
methomyl
oxamyl
phorate1
terbufos1
imidacloprid
thiamethoxam
endosulfan
cartap
thiocyclam
mancozeb
maneb
propineb
ziram
copper carbonate, basic
copper hydroxide
copper oxychloride
copper sulfate
copper sulfate, tri-basic
sulfur
chlorothalonil
benomyl
carbendazim
myclobutanil
prochloraz
thiophanate-methyl
captan
cymoxanil
flutolanil
citrus seed extract
glyphosate
linuron
paraquat
Pesticide
active ingredient
Pesticide group
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
OP/C
OP/C
OP/C
OP/C
OP/C
OP/C
OP/C
OP/C
OP/C
OP/C
OP/C
OP/C
OP/C
OP/C
OP/C
OP/C
OP/C
OP/C
B/M/O
B/M/O
B/M/O
B/M/O
NI
NI
NI
NI
NI
OC
OI
OI
OI
D
D
D
D
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
SB
B/C/T
B/C/T
B/C/T
B/C/T
B/C/T
B/C/T
OF
OF
OF
OF
OF
OF
OF
OF
OF
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
B
Table 1: Methamidophos MRLs (tolerances) set by EPA and FAO
commodity ppm commodity ppm
Broccoli 1 Artichoke, globe 0.2
Brussels sprouts 1 Beansa 1
Cabbage 1 Cauliflowerb 0.5
Cauliflower 1 Cotton seed 0.2
Cotton, undelinted seed 0.1 Fodder beet 0.02
Cucumber 1 Peppers, chili 2
Eggplant 1 Peppers, sweet   1
Lettuce 1 Potato 0.05
Melon 0.5 Soybean (dry) 0.1
Pepper 1 Sugar beet 0.02
Potato 0.1 Edible offal, mammalian 0.01
Tomato 1 Edible offal, poultry 0.01
Eggs 0.01
Meatc 0.01
Milks 0.02
Poultry meat 1
c From mammals other than marine 
mammals.
Sources: EPA 2007, 40 CFR 
180.315 and FAO 2008.
b Based on treatment with 
methamidophos or 
acephate.  
EPA tolerances FAO MRLs
a Except broad bean and soybean.
Table 2: Mancozeb MRLs (tolerances) set by EPA and FAO
commodity ppm commodity ppm
Apple 7 Asparagus 0.1    
Asparagus (negligible residue) 0.1 Banana 2    
Banana 4 Barley 1    
Banana, pulp (no peel) 0.5 Barley straw and fodder, dry 25    
Barley, grain 5 Beet, sugar 0.5    
Barley, milled feed fractions 20 Cabbages, head 5    
Barley, straw 25 Carrot 1    
Beet, sugar 2 Cherries 0.2
Beet, sugar, tops 65 Cranberry 5    
Carrot, roots 2 Cucumber 2    
Celery 5 Currants (black, red, & white) 10    
Corn, forage 5 Garlic 0.5    
Corn grain (except popcorn grain)        01. Kale 15    
Corn, stover 5 Leek 0.5    
Cotton, undelinted seed 0.5 Lettuce, head 10    
Crabapple 10 Maize fodder 2    
Cranberry 7 Mandarins 10    
Cucumber 4 Mango 2    
Fennel 10 Melons, except watermelon 0.5    
Fresh corna 0.5 Onion, bulb 0.5    
Grape 7 Oranges (sweet & sour) 2    
Melon 4 Papaya 5    
Oat, bran 20 Peanut 0.1
Oat, grain 5 Peanut fodder 5    
Oat, milled feed fractions 20 Peppers, chili (dry) 10    
Oat, straw 25 Peppers, sweet 1    
Onion, dry bulb 0.5 Pome fruits 5    
Papayab 10 Potato 0.2    
Peanut 0.5 Pumpkins 0.2    
Peanut vine hay 65 Squash, summer 1    
Pear 10 Squash, winter 0.1    
Popcorn grain 0.5 Sweet corn (corn-on-the-cob) 0.1
Quince 10 Watermelon 1
Rye, grain 5 Wheat 1    
Rye, milled feed fractions 20 Wheat straw and fodder, dry 25    
Rye, straw 25 Edible offal, poultry 0.1    
Squash, summer 4 Milks 0.05
Tomato 4 Poultry meat 0.1
Wheat, grain 5
Wheat, milled feed fractions 20    
Wheat, straw 25    
Kidney 0.5
Liver 0.5
c From MRLs of  dithiocarbamates 
specifying mancozeb as the source, or 
no specific source.
EPA tolerances FAO MRLsc
Source: EPA 2007, 40 CFR 180.176 and 
FAO 2008.
a Including sweet corn, kernels plus 
cob with husk removed.
b Whole fruit with no residue present 
in the edible  pulp after the peel is 
removed and discarded.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
all imported vegetables 4 (0)b 13 (0) 0 0 0 0
Costa Rican vegetables 0 0 0 0 0 0
all imported vegetables 476 (17) 376 (19) 0 46 (16) 66 (12) 39 (15)
Costa Rican vegetables 11 (0) 10 (1) 0 3 (2) 2 (0) 1 (1)
Source: FDA 1999-2005, databases IMVE1998 through IMVE2003.
Table 3: Number of  tests that would detect mancozeb & methamidophos on 
fresh vegetables imported into the U.S., as tested by FDA, 1998-2003
b Numbers refer to number of  commodity-country combinations tested, e.g., garlic 
from Thailand; numbers in parentheses refer to number of  commodity-country 
violations (either in excess of  MRL or without an MRL).
a FDA laboratories generally report all EBDC fungicide residues as "EBDC (identity 
unknown)" because all are converted to carbon disulfide for detection (FDA 1994: 
104-3).
methamidophos
mancozeb, reported as EBDC (identity unknown)a
